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Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) constitutes a major public intervention in the 
European Union (EU) which generates large redistributive effects. Significant resources are 
being transferred among producers and consumers of agricultural products and the taxpayers. 
The geographic distribution of these three groups (producers, consumers, taxpayers) in the 
different member states generates also transfers among the member states. 
 
The distribution of benefits and losses under the CAP has attracted the interest of researchers 
in the past. During the 1980s, Buckwell et al (1982) and Brown (1989) dealt with this issue, 
when the rules of the ‘traditional’ CAP were very much in place. In the 1990s, Ackrill, Hine, 
Rayner and Suardi (1997) obtained estimates of the impact of the 1992 CAP reform on the 
existing distribution of benefits and losses. However, their analysis is ex ante in nature and it 
concentrates on the most important products included in the 1992 reform of the CAP, 
excluding the mediterranean products. Tarditi and Zanias (1997 and 2000) do include the 
mediterranean products and obtain ex post results up to 1995 for the EU regions. Zanias 
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  1(2002) includes the mediterranean products, produces results at national levels up to 1999 and 
simulates the potential impact of a partial re-nationalisation of the CAP. 
 
Renewed interest for the issue exists for three reasons: 1) Negotiations currently take place in 
the EU about the 2007-2013 financial framework and the initial positions of the large budget 
contributors call for a reduction in the EU own resources, which is opposed by some other 
member states. Since the financing of the CAP attracts nearly half of the EU budget, the 
distribution of the CAP benefits has important implications for these negotiations. 2) Three 
major reforms of the CAP have taken place (1992, 1999, 2003), which have changed the 
philosophy of the CAP, moving away from price intervention and towards direct subsidies to 
the farmers and rural development measures. Yet the distribution results so far stop in 1999 
and a need for more recent results exists. 3) It is useful to have a benchmarking of the 
distribution of benefits before the implementation of the latest CAP reform (2003) and the 
gradual application of the CAP to the new member states. 
 
This study extends the results of Zanias (2002) regarding the distribution of benefits among 
member states covering the period 1988-2003, and focuses on the “anatomy” of the generated 
transfers and their determinants. 
  
The methodology 
The transfers from consumers to producers take place via the price wedge that exists under the 
CAP between domestic and international prices. This price wedge is maintained by border 
trade measures and budgetary expenditures for export restitutions and storage facilities. The 
transfers from taxpayers to producers involve the direct budgetary payments to producers and 
rural development expenditures. Because both intra and extra EU trade in agricultural 
  2products takes place at higher than world prices and the CAP is financed from a common 
budget, transfers among member states also take place. 
 
The calculation of transfers among member states usually concentrates on modeling trade 
protection measures. However, because the trade protection element of the CAP evolves 
declining, it is chosen here to work with a measurement approach based on a definition of the 
Producer/Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE/CSE) which includes the impact a wide range 
of policies. The definition used is rather narrower than that used by the OECD because the 
aim of this study is the estimation of transfers caused by the CAP, ignoring other levels of 
public intervention. Using this approach, the transfers under the CAP are measured in 
‘income’ rather than ‘real income’ terms with the latter differing from the former by taking 
into account the variation in the producers’ and/or consumers’ marginal evaluation of the 
resources affected by the protection. 
 
Adopting a PSE/CSE framework, the net transfers to each member state consist of the sum of 
transfers to its producers minus the cost borne, under the CAP, by domestic consumers and 
taxpayers. These can be represented by the following equation for each member state (i): 
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where: j refers to the individual commodities; 
  Q = quantity of domestic production; 
  P = domestic price; 
 P w = international price; 
  3  DP = value of direct payments to the producers; 
  II = quantity of imports from other member states; 
  IT = quantity of imports from third countries; 
  XI = quantity of exports to other member states; 
  XT = quantity of exports to third countries; 
  Q+II+IT-XI-XT= quantity of apparent consumption; 
BC = budgetary contribution of member state for CAP purposes. 
(P-Pw) = the price gap between domestic and international prices. 
 
Equation (1) gives the net transfer of resources under the CAP to each member state by 
subtracting the losses to the domestic consumers and taxpayers from the gains to the domestic 
producers. Thus, the first square bracket gives the gain to the producers, which arises from 
receiving the higher, compared to the international, domestic prices (P-Pw) and the direct 
payments from the budget (DP). The latter corresponds approximately to what the 2003 
reform terms as the Single Farm Payment. The second bracket gives the loss to the consumers, 
which arises from paying the higher domestic price (P-Pw) for the quantities consumed from 
each product (approached here with apparent consumption). Taxpayers contribute for CAP 
purposes to the EU budget an amount equal to BC (third square bracket). BC is calculated as 
the total contribution of the member state to the own resources of the EU budget multiplied by 
the share of the FEOGA Guarantee Section in the general EU budget. 
 
Equation (1) gives the net transfers to each member state as the summation of the benefits and 
losses of the three social groups involved. However, a better idea about the way the transfers 
take place can be obtained by rewriting equation (1) in the following form:  
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The three square brackets of equation (2) give the Net Transfer to each member state as the 
sum of the three ways in which resources are transferred from the operation of the CAP. Thus, 
the first square bracket gives the net direct budgetary transactions of each member state 
resulting from the operation of the CAP (the sum of receipts minus the budgetary 
contribution). The second and third square brackets give the resources transferred through 
trading at the higher domestic prices (P) rather than the international prices (Pw).  The second 
square bracket measures the resources transferred among member states through intra-EU 
trade. Thus, the consumers of the importing member state transfer resources to the producers 
of the exporting member state. The third square bracket gives the benefit (in the case of a net 
exporting member state) from trading at higher than world prices with third countries or the 
loss (in the case of a net importing member state)
1. 
 
Data Inputs 
The quantitative analysis covers the period 1988-2003. All information but the price data were 
obtained from EU sources
2. The price data used in the calculation of the price gaps between 
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2 Trade data were obtained from the COMMEXT database of Eurostat. EU budget expenditure data from the 
Financial Report of the Guarantee Section of FEOGA. EU budget national contributions from CEC (1998), and 
various EC budget reports. Other data from the Agricultural Situation in the European Union. 
  5domestic and international prices were taken from the PSE database of OECD for the 
commodities covered by this database. The mediterranean products olive oil, wine, fruits and 
vegetables, cotton and tobacco were added to this list because of their importance for the 
Southern EU member states. Although the bulk of the support for these products is given in 
the form of direct payments, border protection also exists for some of them during parts of the 
period considered in this study. Because of the difficulties in obtaining domestic and 
international representative prices to be used in the calculation of the nominal protection rates 
in these cases, an indirect approach was used. Thus, protection rates were obtained as the ratio 
of the expenditure for export refunds for each one of these products and the value of exports 
of each product to third countries. In this way, protection rates for all products covered by the 
CAP were calculated and they are presented in table 6 in the appendix. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The results show that about half of the member states gain from the operation of the CAP in 
EU-15 and the other half suffer net losses (figure 1, and tables 1 and 2 in the appendix). 
Throughout the period covered by this study (1988-2003), Ireland is by far the largest 
beneficiary country under the CAP. The net benefit is in fact rising with the largest being 
recorded at the end of the period (65,2% of gross value added of agriculture (GVA) in 2002-
2003). At the end also of the period, six more member states record a net benefit: Denmark 
(24,2%), Greece (20,1%), Finland (10,1), France (8,9%), Austria (8,1%) and Spain (7,3%).  
Ireland, Denmark and Greece have been on the side of the gainers throughout the period 
considered. France and Spain switched from losers to gainers after the MacSharry reform 
(implemented gradually from 1993/4 to 1995/6). Austria and Finland experienced losses 
during the first years of their membership but quickly turned into net beneficiaries. 
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Figure 2.  Producer Benefit per AWU by Member State (‘000€ - 2002/2003 average) 
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  7Eight member states recorded a negative net transfer to other member states in 2002-2003.  In 
fact, all eight countries have been associated with negative transfers thought the period 
considered. Germany, Sweden, Belgium/Luxembourg
3 and the United Kingdom
4 are the 
countries associate with the largest negative transfers. 
 
The results on the transfer mechanisms (budgetary transactions, internal trade, external trade) 
are shown in table 3 in the appendix. According to these results, and despite the policy shift 
towards lower administered prices and farmer compensation through direct payments, 
resource transfers through trade are still very important and, in some cases, more important 
than before. This is due to both increases in trade volumes and reductions in the international 
prices of some products which lead to large price gaps with domestic prices. This is clearly 
shown in tables 6 and 7 in the appendix where the nominal protection rates and the 
international prices respectively are shown. In particular the beef/veal prices in 2003 were at 
about half their level in 1995. The prices of pork meat also dropped significantly. Mainly as a 
result of these “external” factors, the net benefits for the two largest beneficiaries of the CAP 
(Ireland and Denmark) doubled from the middle 1990s (1995/96) to the early 2000s 
(2002/03). Ireland benefited from the reduction in beef/veal prices and Denmark from these 
and pork prices also. Because of these price gaps, as shown in table 3, the benefits of 
Denmark come almost exclusively from trading at higher than world prices. On the other 
hand, countries like Greece are not affected much by movements in international prices, 
which was the second, to Ireland, largest beneficiary of the CAP in the 1990s, because its 
most important products (cotton, olive oil, tobacco) are covered by direct subsidies from the 
budget. 
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“Rotterdam-Antwerp effect” which credits more exports to these countries, affecting the calculation of the trade 
transfers, and which is a problem that all analyses of this kind faces. 
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The distribution of the cost of the CAP between consumers and taxpayers must have been also 
affected by the evolution in international prices. Thus, the relative importance of CT 
(consumer transfers) compared to BT (budgetary transfers) in table 4 remains about the same 
(about 1,23) between 1995/96 (when the implementation of the MacSharry reform was 
completed) and 2002/03 (after the 1999 reform). On the contrary, it was reduced from 1,84 to 
1,24 between 1988/89 (before the reform) and 1995/96 (when, in fact, world prices were 
high). 
 
The success of the CAP reforms during the 1990s is shown by the evolution, during the period 
considered, of the net benefits and losses for the individual member states. The rule is that 
benefits tend to increase and losses tend to decrease. The policy mix that has been adopted 
after the reforms and the movements in international prices are responsible for this. The 
partial disassociation of benefits from levels of production has increased budgetary payments 
to the producers, reduced the scope for open-ended support, curtailed increases in the 
budgetary cost of the CAP (and therefore national contributions to the budget). 
 
The case of Germany deserves special attention. Towards the end of the period considered the 
negative net transfers of Germany have been reduced considerably (in fact about halved as a 
proportion of the gross value added of its agricultural sector). This is mainly due to the 
significant increase of the budgetary payments to its producers and, at the same time, a 
decrease in its contribution to the EU budget own resources. The latter has to do with the 
reduction in the EU total own resources in 2001-2003 at a level somewhat lower than the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
4 The United Kingdom rebate is maintained throughout this study. 
  91996-1998. Since Germany contributes about one-fifth of the EU budget own resources, its 
own contribution is reduced significantly and the improvement in its net position obtains. 
 
The future of the German losses under the CAP depends on the negotiations about the 
finances of the EU budget after 2007, which are currently under way, and the fate of the EU 
Commission proposal on a new system preventing excessive negative budgetary imbalances 
in the EU (EC 2004). The Commission proposal purports to generalize the system which give 
for the last two decades the budget rebate to the United Kingdom. Since Germany has been 
overtaken in terms of economic prosperity by some other member states, if the proposal is 
adopted by the Council, it will have some favorable impact on the net German budgetary 
position. On the other hand the next financial framework needs more resources to 
accommodate the EU enlargement. 
 
As shown in table 5, the transfers to the producers of agricultural products (PT) are rising 
throughout this period. At the same time their number is continuously decreasing (also in table 
5). These developments have resulted to a sharp increase in the CAP transfers per person 
employed in the European agriculture (full time equivalent) from 6600 euros in 1988/89 to 
14530 euros in 2002/03. Equally important is also the distribution of these transfers per 
person employed among the member states. As shown in table 5, the operation of the CAP in 
2002/03 transferred to a full time farmer in Denmark eleven times more euros compared to a 
full time farmer in Portugal. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The results of this study show that about half of the EU member states transfer resources to 
the other half through the operation of the CAP. However, the policy mix that was adopted 
  10through reforms during the 1990s, assisted by movements in international prices, has 
increased the number of member states who receive positive transfers and reduced the cost to 
the net losers. Germany seems to have improved its negative position and may improve it 
further if the Commission proposal to preventing excessive negative budgetary imbalances 
goes ahead.  
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Table 1. Net Benefit/Loss under the CAP by Member State 
 
   Average  Member 
State     1988/89 1995/96  2002/03 
MECUs  -795,1 -830,2  -594,7  B/L 
%GVA  -29,9%  -28,2%  -21,6% 
MECUs  231,7 541,5  742,7  DK 
%GVA  7,5%  13,9%  24,2% 
MECUs  -5.558,5 -8.018,5  -3.241,2  D 
%GVA  -43,3%  -49,5%  -20,3% 
MECUs  586,7 1.584,7  1.660,9  GR 
%GVA  6,7%  19,1%  20,1% 
MECUs  -627,2 1.458,5  1.861,6  ESP 
%GVA  -4,1%  7,2%  7,3% 
MECUs  -1.271,9 1.623,4  2.774,5  F 
%GVA  -4,9%  5,3%  8,9% 
MECUs  611,1 985,4  1.663,0  IRL 
%GVA  31,5%  32,2%  65,2% 
MECUs  -2.284,7 -1.627,5  -2.109,5  I 
%GVA  -9,1%  -6,4%  -7,3% 
MECUs  -256,1 -1.031,8  -826,7  NL 
%GVA  -3,4%  -10,8%  -9,1% 
MECUs  -257,6 -222,9  -129,8  P 
%GVA  -12,4%  -8,0%  -4,0% 
MECUs  -3.029,2 -2.349,8  -2.307,4  UK 
%GVA  -30,4%  -19,2%  -20,5% 
MECUs     -536  220,4233  A 
%GVA     -16,8%  8,1% 
MECUs     -808,977  -509,972  SWE 
%GVA     -47,9%  -32,3% 
MECUs     -294,246  153,937  FIN 
%GVA     -18,0%  10,1% 
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 Table 2. Net benefit/Loss under the CAP by Member State (1988-2003) 
 
  UNIT  1988                                1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mil€                                     -897,5 -692,7 -609,1 -724,8 -712,5 -840,2 -1.007,4 -818,1 -842,3 -853,4 -794,3 -872,8 -725,8 -1.053,3 -497,5 -691,8 B/L 
   %GVA  -36,8%  -23,1%  -21,1%  -25,1%  -24,4%  -28,4%  -32,8%  -28,0%  -28,3%  -28,2%  -27,3%  -31,9%  -24,8%  -35,2%  -18,5%  -24,8% 
mil€                                     291,3 172,1 388,4 314,0 72,1 179,9 371,8 549,3 533,6 576,8 591,6 1.025,9 723,3 645,6 752,8 732,7 DK 
   %GVA  10,0%  5,0%  11,1%  9,3%  2,2%  5,7%  11,0%  14,1%  13,6%  15,4%  19,4%  34,4%  20,9%  16,6%  24,3%  24,1% 
mil  €                                  -5.715,4 -5.401,7 -4.354,8 -6.938,1 -7.255,9 -8.875,2 -9.756,7 -7.637,8 -8.399,1 -7.365,4 -5.209,3 -4.921,5 -6.047,9 -4.636,5 -2.276,0 -4.206,4 D 
   %GVA  -45,1%  -41,5%  -32,6%  -52,0%  -54,6%  -63,5%  -68,1%  -48,4%  -50,5%  -44,9%  -33,3%  -31,6%  -34,6%  -23,1%  -13,9%  -26,8% 
mil  €                                412,7 760,6 929,5 1.171,6 1.291,2 1.548,1 1.589,9 1.366,2 1.803,1 1.704,4 1.452,5 1.524,0 1.622,7 1.583,4 1.686,5 1.635,3  GR 
   %GVA  4,7%  8,6%  12,5%  13,2%  16,6%  21,8%  20,0%  16,2%  22,0%  20,2%  17,8%  18,2%  19,8%  18,8%  20,3%  19,9% 
mil  €                                  -432,6 -821,8 -621,4 -81,4 -197,9 383,8 1.052,3 1.878,8 1.038,2 1.101,7 1.697,0 1.490,5 1.411,0 2.074,3 1.846,3 1.877,0 ESP 
   %GVA  -2,6%  -5,6%  -3,1%  -0,4%  -1,1%  2,2%  5,5%  9,8%  4,7%  4,8%  7,4%  6,9%  6,1%  8,3%  7,6%  7,0% 
mil  €                                  -1.188,1 -1.355,7 602,8 -487,0 119,3 -95,2 209,1 1.791,5 1.455,4 1.451,4 2.851,2 3.238,8 1.278,9 1.289,1 2.712,0 2.837,0 F 
   %GVA  -4,9%  -5,0%  2,1%  -1,9%  0,4%  -0,4%  0,7%  5,8%  4,7%  4,7%  8,9%  10,2%  4,0%  4,1%  8,6%  9,3% 
mil  €                                  554,0 668,1 836,1 733,0 994,8 757,7 745,8 1.019,8 951,0 1.486,4 1.370,2 1.884,1 1.427,2 1.260,0 1.553,2 1.772,9 IRL 
   %GVA  28,5%  34,6%  29,4%  27,4%  32,3%  25,1%  24,8%  33,3%  31,0%  49,0%  47,6%  72,1%  50,2%  47,1%  62,3%  68,2% 
mil  €                                  -2.022,7 -2.546,7 -1.988,3 -3.677,5 -2.571,1 -3.577,7 -1.960,9 -1.636,4 -1.618,5 -1.025,2 -2.607,0 -2.041,2 -2.197,3 -2.267,0 -1.570,1 -2.648,8 I 
   %GVA  -8,6%  -9,7%  -7,6%  -12,6%  -9,1%  -14,8%  -8,0%  -6,8%  -5,9%  -3,6%  -9,2%  -7,1%  -7,8%  -7,7%  -5,5%  -9,1% 
mil  €                                -464,4 -47,9 423,1 -544,6 -613,5 -777,8 -1.389,6 -932,0 -1.131,6 -1.090,0 -1.020,3 -882,2 -1.262,0 -1.488,4 -712,7 -940,6  NL 
   %GVA  -6,2%  -0,6%  4,8%  -6,0%  -6,8%  -9,2%  -15,1%  -9,6%  -12,1%  -12,3%  -11,2%  -10,1%  -13,6%  -15,6%  -7,9%  -10,3% 
mil€                                     -272,5 -242,7 -325,0 -379,5 -424,3 -489,3 -535,6 -236,3 -209,4 -130,5 -24,4 -268,7 -265,7 -81,4 -131,2 -128,4 P 
   %GVA  -14,5%  -10,2%  -12,0%  -13,7%  -18,7%  -23,9%  -21,3%  -8,8%  -7,3%  -5,0%  -1,0%  -9,4%  -9,9%  -2,5%  -4,1%  -3,9% 
mil  €                                  -2.900,4 -3.157,9 -3.013,4 -1.871,8 -2.684,1 -3.019,5 -1.549,3 -2.549,5 -2.150,0 -1.497,2 -2.377,9 -2.139,6 -3.992,1 -1.389,4 -2.487,3 -2.127,5 UK 
   %GVA  -30,4%  -30,3%  -30,2%  -18,0%  -25,3%  -26,5%  -13,0%  -20,8%  -17,7%  -12,6%  -21,6%  -19,7%  -36,9%  -12,8%  -22,3%  -18,8% 
mil€                 -945,9  -126,1  -344,5  -286,6  -92,7  -86,1  -21,1  255,7  185,1 A 
   %GVA                -29,3%  -4,3%  -12,5%  -10,9%  -3,5%  -3,2%  -0,7%  9,3%  6,9% 
mil€                                     -923,1 -694,8 -528,9 -576,5 -568,0 -759,6 -652,1 -403,0 -617,0 SWE 
   %GVA                -55,6%  -40,2%  -30,3%  -35,1%  -39,7%  -47,2%  -42,5%  -25,6%  -39,1% 
mil€                     -491,4  -97,1  -173,5  -200,1  -144,1  -1,9 87,2 172,2  135,7 FIN 
   %GVA                -29,9%  -6,1%  -11,3%  -18,1%  -11,3%  -0,1%  5,7%  10,9%  9,3% 
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 3. Net transfers among member states by transfer mechanism 
 
1988, 1989 average  1995, 1996 average  2002, 2003 average  Member 
State  B                        IT TT NT B IT TT NT B IT TT NT
B/L  -822,1                        135,6 -108,6 -795,1 -1.260,9 16,7 414,0 -830,2 -1.155,1 193,3 367,2 -594,7
DK  -365,3                      250,5 346,5 231,7 -53,4 158,6 436,3 541,5 -8,9 232,1 519,5 742,7
D  -5.848,9                        -28,9 319,2 -5.558,5 -7.647,8 -338,8 -31,8 -8.018,5 -3.626,2 365,2 19,8 -3.241,2
GR  835,4                        -214,9 -33,8 586,7 1.829,1 -238,6 -5,8 1.584,7 2.014,2 -330,1 -23,2 1.660,9
ESP  -771,2                        123,9 20,1 -627,2 1.361,7 65,5 31,3 1.458,5 1.945,9 -34,7 -49,5 1.861,6
F  -3.702,1                        1.216,4 1.213,9 -1.271,9 -325,9 1.013,1 936,2 1.623,4 1.360,3 649,9 764,4 2.774,5
IRL  -38,0                        315,8 333,2 611,1 300,0 356,8 328,6 985,4 902,0 562,1 198,9 1.663,0
I  -873,5                        -1.258,8 -152,4 -2.284,7 -858,8 -717,7 -50,9 -1.627,5 -736,8 -1.102,8 -269,9 -2.109,5
NL  -1.275,9                        -228,5 1.248,2 -256,1 -2.024,6 331,7 661,0 -1.031,8 -1.774,6 644,0 303,9 -826,7
P  -91,3                        -61,3 -105,0 -257,6 -48,7 -132,2 -42,0 -222,9 56,2 -159,7 -26,4 -129,8
UK  -2.553,3                        -134,7 -341,3 -3.029,2 -2.125,3 -102,5 -121,9 -2.349,8 -1.397,8 -635,9 -273,7 -2.307,4
A  -            - -   - -537,7  1,9 -0,2  -536,0  127,4  76,6  16,4  220,4
SWE  -           - - - -738,9  -47,3  -22,8  -809,0  -362,4  -130,0  -17,6  -510,0
FIN  -             - - - -284,8  -25,0 15,6  -294,2  141,0  -23,1  36,0  153,9
 
Source: Own calculations           
  15Table 4. Distribution of CAP benefits/costs by social group and by member state 
 
1988, 1989 average  1995, 1996 average  2002, 2003 average  Member 
State  PT              CT BT CT/BT PT CT BT CT/BT PT CT BT CT/BT
B/L  1.738,0                        1.437,3 1.095,7 1,31 1.778,7 1.098,2 1.510,8 0,73 2.164,9 1.085,8 1.673,8 0,65
DK  1.994,1                        1.203,3 559,1 2,15 2.243,5 991,9 710,1 1,40 2.380,4 793,3 844,4 0,94
D  10.534,6                        9.166,9 6.926,3 1,32 12.111,1 8.775,8 11.353,8 0,77 13.433,3 7.769,7 8.904,8 0,87
GR  2.661,7                      1.781,3 293,7 6,06 3.824,0 1.692,0 547,3  3,09 3.803,1 1.442,9 699,3 2,06
ESP  5.811,6                        4.613,7 1.825,1 2,53 8.347,3 4.491,0 2.397,8 1,87 10.346,0 5.056,6 3.427,8 1,48
F  13.111,6                        8.940,7 5.442,8 1,64 17.364,4 9.038,4 6.702,6 1,35 19.858,7 9.987,3 7.096,8 1,41
IRL  1.902,4                        1.076,9 214,5 5,02 2.548,7 1.169,4 393,9 2,97 3.490,9 1.300,6 527,3 2,47
I  10.021,8                        8.506,1 3.800,4 2,24 9.740,5 6.894,9 4.473,0 1,54 10.973,7 7.452,0 5.631,1 1,32
NL  3.853,0                        2.472,0 1.637,1 1,51 3.821,3 2.650,6 2.202,5 1,20 3.641,4 2.274,1 2.194,0 1,04
P  1.072,5                        1.093,0 237,0 4,61 1.417,4 1.113,5 526,8 2,11 1.567,2 1.091,6 605,4 1,80
UK  7.310,5                        6.816,2 3.523,4 1,93 8.191,2 6.037,0 4.503,9 1,34 9.100,9 6.662,9 4.745,3 1,40
A   -  -  -   -   1.689,5  1.156,0  1.069,6  1,08  2.188,0  1.055,2  912,4  1,16 
SWE   -  -   -   -   1.279,8  1.073,3  1.015,4  1,06  1.771,8  1.160,0  1.121,7  1,03 
FIN   -  -   -   -   1.180,0  922,6  551,6  1,67  1.661,5  887,9  619,6  1,43 
EU                          60.011,8 47.107,5 25.555,1 1,84 75.537,4 47.104,6 37.959,2 1,24 86.381,7 48.020,0 39.003,7 1,23
 
Note: PT = Producer transfers (benefit); CT = Consumer transfers (loss); BT = Budgetary transfers (loss) 
Source: Own calculations 
 
  16Table 5. Producer Benefit per AWU by Member State 
 
1988, 1989 average  1995, 1996 average  2002, 2003 average  Member 
State  PT  AWU  PT / AWU  PT  AWU  PT / AWU  PT  AWU  PT / AWU 
B/L  1.738,0                  106,0 16,40 1.778,7 86,8 20,49 2.164,9 75,5 28,67
DK  1.994,1                  104,2 19,14 2.243,5 88,9 25,24 2.380,4 71,0 33,53
D  10.534,6                  811,9 12,98 12.111,1 777,1 15,58 13.433,3 621,4 21,62
GR  2.661,7                  828,1 3,21 3.824,0 634,5 6,03 3.803,1 539,3 7,05
ESP  5.811,6                  1.365,2 4,26 8.347,3 1.103,5 7,56 10.346,0 980,3 10,55
F  13.111,6                  1.500,1 8,74 17.364,4 1.134,0 15,31 19.858,7 979,5 20,27
IRL  1.902,4                  256,1 7,43 2.548,7 232,0 10,99 3.490,9 158,3 22,05
I  10.021,8                  1.941,8 5,16 9.740,5 1.430,0 6,81 10.973,7 1.157,0 9,48
NL  3.853,0                  229,5 16,79 3.821,3 224,2 17,04 3.641,4 206,2 17,66
P  1.072,5                  1.013,8 1,06 1.417,4 657,1 2,16 1.567,2 511,4 3,06
UK  7.310,5                  444,0 16,47 8.191,2 387,8 21,12 9.100,9 307,8 29,57
A              1.689,5  193,0 8,75 2.188,0  164,4 13,31
SWE                   1.279,8 89,0 14,38 1.771,8 74,8 23,69
FIN                1.180,0  126,8 9,31 1.661,5 97,5 17,04
EU                    60.011,8 9.093,2 6,60 75.537,4 7.164,7 10,54 86.381,7 5.944,3 14,53
 
Note: PT in million euros, PT / AWU in 000 euros. 
Source: Own calculations and EUROSTAT – NewCronos Database 
  17Table 6. Nominal Protection Rates in EU Agriculture (1988-2003) 
 
PRODUCT  1988                                1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Wheat  69,9 26,0        46,0 105,0 68,0 54,3 39,7 14,5 0,0 0,0 23,1 32,4 8,9 3,1 0,0 1,3
Maize  71,1 55,1        91,0 103,0 103,8 68,9 44,9 52,6 13,7 19,4 31,9 38,6 20,9 10,3 0,2 22,7
Barley  79,2 41,2        85,2 106,1 103,4 105,2 99,9 41,0 2,1 7,6 64,6 43,5 2,2 0,0 0,0 2,3
Rice  107,2 100,7        106,5 94,4 129,3 136,5 132,2 87,8 32,6 30,7 17,7 0,0 0,0 40,9 27,3 29,3
Oilseeds  0,0 0,0 0,0      0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Sugar  118,2 53,5        78,1 116,9 141,7 109,1 74,9 73,0 87,2 92,3 116,8 148,2 103,0 90,1 124,0 157,4
Olive Oil  26,5 33,5        39,0 34,3 11,4 18,0 12,1 7,4 8,3 6,1 4,2 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Wine  2,3 2,1        2,6 2,7 3,7 4,6 3,4 1,6 1,6 1,8 1,1 0,7 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,4
F & V  3,1 3,7        3,6 3,6 4,6 6,8 6,9 9,0 3,1 2,5 1,5 1,6 1,5 1,5 1,2 0,8
Milk  94,4 87,6        153,3 131,9 132,5 125,2 119,2 105,3 94,7 89,3 124,0 96,2 65,2 63,8 85,7 95,3
Beef & Veel  74,8 75,6        91,7 144,2 86,8 59,8 50,5 66,6 67,4 115,7 116,0 119,7 111,2 135,0 155,8 167,4
Porkmeat  25,1 8,5        -0,7 5,9 -6,4 9,2 9,8 11,6 16,1 12,3 14,9 43,9 31,4 24,3 22,4 26,7
Poultrymeat  33,5 37,4        46,3 38,1 63,7 68,2 77,3 88,9 70,7 47,7 36,1 64,3 51,1 48,4 53,6 51,0
Sheepmeat  187,6 155,0        137,6 108,6 99,9 33,9 50,2 72,2 44,9 26,8 35,1 33,3 24,6 42,0 30,9 35,1
Eggs  12,8 21,7 3,9 4,8 7,2 4,7 -3,5 7,0 4,4 0,1 7,3 11,6 1,9 -0,7 0,0    -1,3
Tobacco  23,8 29,7        23,3 19,4 15,3 9,9 13,3 10,5 0,6 -0,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Cotton  0,0 0,0        0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD PSE database data. 
 
  18Table 7. World Prices for Selected Products (1988-1993) 
 
PRODUCT  1988                                1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Wheat  100                                        141 109 80 100 101 104 126 153 135 100 91 114 124 119 124
Maize  103                                        114 95 94 85 94 100 106 139 113 98 97 112 120 126 112
Barley  87                                        112 81 72 75 68 66 93 126 111 66 78 109 113 101 106
Rice  154                                        166 142 146 144 155 154 191 276 243 249 285 302 201 220 226
Sugar  17                                        26 23 18 16 18 23 23 22 21 17 14 18 21 18 14
Milk  131                                        149 104 110 115 124 129 143 155 155 131 143 183 197 169 156
Beef & Veel  1.483                                1.590 1.303  938 1.291 1.536 1.610 1.613 1.478 1.159 1.154 1.127 1.223 944 936  894 
Porkmeat  872                                1.338 1.344 1.197 1.522 1.030 1.055 1.145 1.333 1.385 918 665 1.006 1.284 1.041  923 
Poultrymeat  721                                        733 581 638 520 528 507 435 615 692 667 481 623 713 642 633
Sheepmeat  1.233                                1.457 1.348 1.351 1.508 2.259 2.158 1.774 2.497 2.951 2.360 2.412 2.847 2.885 3.166 3.083 
Eggs  664                                      666 795 825 715 793 814 674 929 875 709 624 908 943 956   1.137
 
Source: OECD – PSE Database. 
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